The encounter between the bishops and the emperor found its exemplary expression in Bishop Ambrosius' excommunication of Emperor Theodosius I in 390, following a massacre in Saloniki, and the order for him to repent in public. The emperor, as a Christian, stood within the church and not above it, Ambrosious wrote (Ep. 21, 4); the bishops pronounced judgment upon the emperor and not the emperor upon the bishops.

In Ambrosious' vein but a hundred years later, in 494, the Roman bishop Gelasius I wrote a famous letter to Emperor Anastasios I which comments on the question of the dual authority of emperors and bishops: The world is governed by two powers, the holy authority of priests and the royal power (Duo sunt quippe, imperator auguste, quibus principaliter murctus hic regitur, auctorias sacrata pontificum et regalis potestas, DS 347). The relationship between these two powers is one of mutual subjection: In temporal matters (quantim ad ordinem publicae... disciplinae) even the "superiors" (antistetes) are subject to imperial laws, while in spiritual matters even the emperors must subject themselves to the bishop's authority. Thus the relationship between temporal and spiritual power in Christianity was described; this interpretation prevailed throughout the Christian Middle Ages. Although Gelasius states that this distinction only refers to "this world" (hic mundus), it in fact describes only the order within a society defined by Christianity. In the pre-Christian Roman empire as well as in other cultures, the Christian distinction between secular and spiritual power was and is unknown—as in the example of Islam. In these instances, the highest political power is at the same time also the religious authority; rarely is the highest religious authority at the same time at the top of the political hierarchy.

What is the theological foundation of this peculiarly Christian relationship of the religious community to the political system? Decisive for the separation of church and state, and always in Christian awareness, was Jesus' answer to Pilate when he asked whether Jesus was—as alleged by his accusers—the "King of Jews," that is to say, a pretender for the rule over the people of Israel, in rebellion against the Roman Empire. Jesus responded, "My empire is not of this world" (John 18,36). The empire of God announced by Jesus is the kingdom of God, in contrast to the powers and states of men. This was often understood to mean that Jesus' empire was an otherworldly empire, an empire not in this world. But the coming reign of God is, according to Jesus' message, very effective already today and in this world, everywhere Jesus' prophesy ofits coming is believed. It is just not "from" this world; it comes from God himself. Jesus' word offers no direct instruction on the structure of the relationship of the Church to the political order in a cultural world formed by Christianity. This question was posed later, in the post-Constantinian era. Here, the rule of the Christian emperors was understood as a worldly expression ofGod's rule, namely as the worldly representation of the elevated Christ's invisible rule at God's right hand. But why was the distinction between church and state in the Christian Empire nonetheless maintained? This question is not easily answered by reference to the relevant word of Jesus: "Give the emperor what is the emperor's, and give God what is God's" (Mark 12, 17). Jesus' suggestion does not agree with the self-definition of the Christian empire: the Christian emperors of post-Constantinian era saw themselves as representatives of God's rule, which Jesus had announced. In this, they differed from Tiberius, the Roman emperor at Jesus' time. Why, then, is there still the axiomatic difference between church and state?

The answer can only be that this difference is an expression of the eschatological conscience of Christianity: all secular political power, including the empire of the Christian emperors, is temporary when viewed in the light of the coming empire of God. Christians anticipate this coming will terminate the secular rule of man over man. The gospel of the Church and its sacraments connect the believers even now with salvation in God's empire. This is why the existence of the church relativizes its distinction from political power and its claims for ultimate validity—claims easily connected with the power of the state. The secular order is not the ultimate absolute entity ruling human lives.

The relativization of the claims of the secular order on the lives of individuals is exacerbated by the fact that the empire of God is, in its biblical description, considered in terms of political character: Only the coming rule of God will realize peace and justice among men-which is the task of all political systems. This is expressed in the prophetic parable of the future pilgrimage of the peoples to Zion in order to let the God of Israel settle their legal disputes (Jes 2,2-4, Mi 4,1-4). Peace is the consequence of the settlement of legal disputes between humans and peoples. Only where God rules in man's heart are right and justice truly realized. All rule by man over man is connected with injustice. For this reason only God's rule will adequately fulfil man's political destiny in a life in communion with all others. This is why all human political order is only temporal in relation to the ultimate community of men in God's empire. In contrast, the church even in this world provides the individual human being with access to the ultimate salvation—even if only in sketch-like form—in the celebration of Jesus' last supper, which has found its continuation in the eucharist celebration of the church and was, from its very inception, the representation of the future community of men in the empire of God. Therefore, it is not so that the church itself as a social association realizes the empire of God, even if only in preliminary form, by the community of its members. Among Christians and in the life of the church, there is also dispute, jealousy, lack of solidarity, even dictatorship of one over the others. However, in the center of its worship, in the celebration of the eucharist, the church is an effective sign of the empire of God, which is present through Jesus Christ in it.

Both the church and the state exist in reference to God' s realm—the state by assuring in a temporal manner rights and peace for the community of man; the church by celebrating the ultimate future of the community in the empire of God through signs and sacraments from the Lord's Last Supper, so that this future becomes the present for believers.

The common reference to the future of the empire of God should ease the cooperation of church and state on the foundation of Christianity. The Church admonishes its members to obey the state's rules because it recognizes in it the temporary form of the realization of the divine order. The state that is aware of its own temporariness knows itself dependent on the order of consciousness of its citizens, which cannot be enforced by state devices; depending on how clearly its concrete form of legal order is oriented on the eternal scale, the state can see itself as legitimized by the hope for the future of God's kingdom alive in the Church.

Not always in the history of Christianity was the coexistence of church and state authority harmonious. Especially in Western Christianity, there were rivalries between church and state authority in the Middle Ages; they were fateful for Christendom and contributed to the disintegration of the cultural world. It may correspond with the model of power division that each was concerned about the well-being of the other: the Church admonished the state to take better care of its obligations and, conversely, kings and emperors attempted to restore the ecclesiastic life in situations of decay. The latter certainly applied in the Middle Ages when the political dignitaries saw themselves as answerable to the God of the Christian gospel and were active as important members of the Church community (praecipua membra ecclesiae) working for its "external order," as it was called later in Protestantism. Again and again the temptation arose to treat the bishops as employees at the command of secular lords; conversely, the era of the investiture dispute demonstrated the Church' s temptation to claim dominion over royal and imperial powers. The resulting conflicts shook the foundations of the occidental cultures of the Middle Ages and opened the way for the independence of the political order, as was first shown in the absolutism of kings and princes in their respective territories.

The split of the occidental Church pushed this impulse to a breakthrough. The principle of the Westfalian peace accord of 1648, according to which each territory had to follow the religion of its prince (cuius regio, eius religio), made the confessional status of the church in the individual territories dependent on the preference of the holders of political power, involving the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed creeds. At the same time, as a reaction to the religious wars between Protestants and Catholics in the l6th and l7th centuries, the societal order began to be detached from religion, because the dispute around the religious creeds disturbed or endangered the societal peace. Instead of religion, the political order of the society, law, ethics, and public culture as such were now based on a common nature of man and all citizens. From similar ground developed a concept of natural law and the state founded on natural law, as well as the idea of natural religion as the basis of the state authority. The foundation of government on the nature of man and his needs has prevailed to this day because human rights have increasingly become the fundamental measure of state order and, beyond it, of international politics—including even warfare. Historically, human rights originated in the Netherlands of the late 16th century, where they consisted in a reservation of rights of the individual citizen against the state's claims, guaranteed as such by the constitution. During the Middle Ages, the distinction between sacred and secular powers was in a certain sense a preparation for the modern perception of the secular state. The Lutheran teaching of the two governments by God—the distinction between the spiritual government of God in the Church and the worldly government transferred to Princes and states—has contributed to it. In his missive "On secular government, in how far one owes obedience" of 1523, Luther was mainly concerned with the Christian duty of obedience toward the secular government, but also with the limitations of this duty as well as with usurpations by the church on the competence of the secular government. Important for the development of the modern secular state was the fact that Luther no longer treated the difference of secular and spiritual power on the foundation of a society defined altogether by Christianity. Instead, he spoke of worldly power in general, with an eye toward other cultures, especially Islam; Luther was able to say that the worldly law was held in higher esteem by the sultans than by many a Christian prince. Luther stated that everywhere, even beyond Christendom, the preservation of the legal order is an action on behalf of the secular regiment of God, so that Christians shall subject themselves (in the meaning of Rom 13, lf.) to the orders of secular offices, in obedience to God's order. This command by theApostle referred essentially to the behavior of Christians toward the agencies of a pagan state.

The disassociation of the secular state power and its laws from the context of the dual power within Christendom led to the modern secular state, which is a completely different matter than the secular power of kings and emperors where the social order is based on Christianity. As mentioned above, the modern state relies for its legitimacy on the nature of man, from which emanate the principles of freedom and equality, among others. The Christian religion is no longer needed for the legitimation of the secular state. Even if the constitutions of the modern era include references to the responsibility of the constitution writers before God and even if assurances are given that the constitutional norms were formulated with this responsibility in mind, they allude to a God of natural religion—a God who expresses the nature of man—rather than the God of the Christian revelation. The religious creed in the secular state has increasingly become a private matter for the individual citizen. The state as such is religion-neutral. The modem democratic state avows respect for the belief-contents of Christianity and of other religions only insofar as the majority requires it and as it corresponds with the judgment of public opinion. This applies, as the newest developments have shown, also to moral standards in the areas of marriage and family originating in Christianity. The influence of the churches and Christianity on the legal structure of the state, higher education, and public culture in general thrives or declines with the number of Christians in a society, but also with the degree of decisiveness with which Christian citizens of a country assert their Christian convictions and demand their inclusion in public life.

One would expect that there are still other important points of view for the relationship between the modern secular state and Christianity. This is the historic origin of the modern secular state, arising from the cultural tradition stamped by Christianity. So that it can maintain its secularity, the secular state requires the opposite of the spiritual authority of the Church—that is to say, its acknowledgment of the provisional nature ofits legal and governmental order. The secular state cannot secure alone the continuation of the moral values and norms upon which its legal order—and its relevance in the consciousness of its citizens—is based. Nonetheless, that same secular state must work to perpetuate these so-called 'basic values' that are rooted in the great part of the cultural heritage formed by Christianity—for example, the conviction of importance of the involate dignity of the individual, his freedom and his life. For these reasons, the secular state should, regardless of its neutrality toward its citizens' religious creeds and the different churches and religious communities in its territories, nurture the awareness of its cultural origin and the roots of the values basic to its own existence. The secular state should remain aware of the continued import of its origins stemming from the cultural tradition based on Christianity. The U.S. is much more forthright in this respect than is Europe; in their speeches, American presidents often evoke the ]ewish-Christian tradition from which the newly-formed American nation arose. In Europe, at least in Germany, people are more timid to do as much, as if the reminder of the state's historical origin and its religious stamp violated the postulate of religious neutrality. But the secular state of the present time did not arise in a vacuum. Promoting public awareness of the roots of the state's legal system and political structure in a country formed by Christianity does not adversely affect tolerance toward other religious communities in its territories, nor does it violate neutrality toward different church communities. The same applies to the nascent political union of the European nations. Despite the Enlightenment and the emancipation it offered from the medieval form of Christianity, the common cultural basis of the European peoples is defined in large part by Christianity, alongside the common heritage of antiquity. One should expect that all religious creeds and communities existing today in Europe will not only be aware of this fact but also take it into account by adapting to the framework thus provided when they establish themselves on the cultural soil of Europe. One cannot expect today's Europeans to repress the religious influence on their history and culture for the sake of the principle of religious neutrality. On the contrary, the existing historical foundation requires nurturing in the consciousness of the European peoples.

Here also lies an obligation of the Christian churches toward the modern secular state. The churches must remind the secular state of its own religious roots. This is the public responsibility of the churches to the state. It includes pointing out tendencies toward deviation from moral and legal standards based upon this tradition, as well as warning against the foreseeable consequences of a dissolution of such cultural foundations. If churches neglected this obligation, so too would they neglect their public responsibilities.

A reminder of the Christian roots of the cultural and moral foundations even of the modern secular state protects the state and society from the dangers of the ideologies which have supplanted the earlier religious legitimation of the state's authority. In confronting such ideological tendencies, the churches will bring to the forefront Christianity's image of the human as well as its means for forming judgment, constituted by basic values and standards.

The latter task is closely connected with the elementary function of the separation of church and state throughout the history of Christianity, even in the period of Christian empires and kingdoms. This is the reminder of the temporariness of all political order and legal order of the state. Modern ideologies have been connected in one way or another with the claim of establishing the ultimate true order in human life. Such claims contradict the Christian message of the future empire of God as the culmination ofhistory and societal destiny of man. In reference to this future of God, all human governmental order—including that of democracy—is a merely temporary order that does not exclude injustice but rather enables a provisional justice and the societal peace emanating from it. The mere existence of the Christian church, in its distinction from the political system, reminds each secular government of its inevitable imperfection in comparison with the future empire of God. Such a reminder prevents—or at least hinders—the ideological hubris of political governance and the consequent appropriation of individuals by the state. The church promotes the tenet that the responsibility to God of the individual's conscience has precedence over the obedience toward the state and deflates tendencies of representing the state's authority as absolute.

Regardless of its religious neutrality, the secular state can also acknowledge the function of the church. Indeed, religious neutrality includes the provision that the state should not usurp religious or quasi-religious authority for itself or its agencies. The memory of the church as the counterpart to the state can help the state and its agencies to come to terms with its own temporariness without neglecting, as a consequence, its duty toward its legal standards and justice. The Church also teaches its members the obligation of obedience toward the state's laws as a precondition for societal peace and as an expression of the divine command. In this instance, the Church can also remind the state of the limits of its authority and thus contribute to maintenance of the state's awareness of its secularity, so that the state will continue to waive absolute claims on the loyalty and life of its citizens.

The secular state's susceptibility to ideologies is an expression ofits weakness, namely the inability to provide its own foundations in secularity without any support from externally-given nomls and values. The secular state will remain dependent on the standards and values that were anchored in the consciousness of its citizens by a different agency. This is ultimately a matter of religion. It was, of all people, the Marxist philosopher Max Horkheimer who said, in a 1970 interview published under the title "The Longing for the Completely Different One," that if there were no God, "Everything would be allowed." All morality, at least in Western countries, is ultimately based on theology. Horkheimer only repeated an insight that was formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 18th century through the confessions fo the Savoy vicar in his novel Emile and expressed again and again in the 19th century by Dostoyevsky in his novel The Brothers Karamazov. If this is the case, the prognoses for a purely secular state without connection to religion can be judged as at best precarious. For these reasons, though the opposition of church and state remains important today, and despite the neutrality of the modern state toward different religious communities within the framework of its legal system, secularity must be complemented with a reminder of the religious foundation of the modern legal state in a religiously-influenced cultural tradition.

© 2000 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
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This paper was presented at a conference entitled "Religious Liberty and the Ideology of the State," in Prague, Czech Republic, in August, 2000. It will be edited for publication. Do not quote without written permission of The Becket Fund.